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Abstract
The Impact of Informed Adversarial Behavior in Graphical Coordination Games
by
Brian A. Canty
How does system-level information impact the ability of an adversary to degrade perfor-
mance in a networked control system? How does the complexity of an adversary affect its
ability to degrade performance? In this thesis, we focus on these questions in the context of
graphical coordination games where an adversary can influence a given fraction of the agents
in the system. Focusing on the class of ring graphs, we use potential game and resistance tree
arguments to explicitly highlight how knowledge of the graph structure and agent identities
can be exploited by an adversary to significantly degrade system performance. We demon-
strate how the lack of such knowledge drastically reduces the potential harm an adversary can
do to the system. Additionally, we show that the ability to employ more complex strategies
enables an adversary to do significantly more harm to the system compared to a less capable
adversary.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A multiagent system can be viewed as a collection of decision-making entities that are pre-
programmed with a control strategy that specifies decisions for all potential observations.
These observations could convey information regarding the local environment, as well as infor-
mation regarding the behavior of other agents in the system. Regardless of the specific problem
domain and informational characteristics, the underlying goal is to derive agent control poli-
cies that ensure that the emergent collective behavior is desirable with respect to a system-level
performance metric.
There are several results in the literature on networked control systems that provide strong
guarantees on the quality of the stochastically stable states under the condition that all agents
follow the prescribed control policies, e.g. consensus and flocking [1, 2], sensor allocation
[3,4], coordination of unmanned vehicles [5], and others. Here, the fact that an agent’s control
policy is influenced by the behavior of other agents may create risks with regards to adversar-
ial interventions. Accordingly, in this thesis we ask whether an adversary can exploit these
interconnections to negatively influence the quality of the emergent collective behavior.
The baseline control strategy that this thesis considers originates from the game theoretic
literature on distributed control [6–9]. One approach in this literature that has received signifi-
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cant research attention is (i) assigning each agent a local objective function that is equal to the
agent’s marginal contribution to the true system-level objective and (ii) assigning each agent a
probabilistic distributed learning rule known as log-linear learning (see Section 2.2) [10–12].
The allure of this approach is that it guarantees that the emergent collective behavior will op-
timize the system-level objective (in an asymptotic sense) for a broad class of multiagent sys-
tems [13]. However, the susceptibility of this approach to adversarial interventions is generally
unknown.
This thesis characterizes the impact of adversarial interventions on log-linear learning for
a class of games known as graphical coordination games [14, 15]. In a graphical coordination
game, each agent selects a convention and derives a benefit for this selection that depends
on how many of the agent’s neighbors (in a graph theoretic sense) have selected the same
convention. We focus on the case where there are only two conventions denoted x and y, and
the potential benefit derived from x is strictly greater than the potential benefit from y. Note
that this does not imply that an agent should always choose x; rather, an agent’s best convention
choice relies heavily on the convention choices of the agent’s neighbors. It is well-known that
if all agents follow the log-linear learning rule in a graphical coordination game, the resulting
asymptotic behavior will optimize social welfare irrespective of the underlying graph or the
convention choices available to the agents [16].
In this thesis we seek to characterize how an adversary can degrade the quality of the emer-
gent collective behavior associated with log-linear learning in graphical coordination games by
posing as one of the agents in the system. Note that the sole adversarial power in this realm
is influencing the agents’ decisions through influencing their objective functions. These ques-
tions were initially posed in [17] with several interesting finds ranging from the susceptibility
of certain graph structures to an analysis on various models of adversarial behavior [18]. In
general, the questions addressed in [18] focused on whether or not an adversary could employ
a strategy that would ensure the emergent collective behavior is complete coordination on the
2
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inferior convention y. In the present paper, we move away from this constraint and focus on
adversarial strategies that minimize the system-level objective, i.e., minimize social welfare.
This thesis focuses on ring graphs where an adversary can influence a given fraction of
the agents in the system. By influence, we mean that the adversary poses as a neighboring
agent that is selecting one of the two conventions, thereby attempting to influence the system’s
agents’ behavior. The main contributions include the following:
— In Theorems 4.1.1 and 4.1.4, we demonstrate how an adversary can exploit knowledge of
the graph structure and the agent identities to derive a strategy that leads to significantly worse
behavior than the adoption of the inferior convention y. Interestingly, the optimal adversarial
strategy involves broadcasting both the desirable x and inferior y conventions to various subsets
of agents.
— In Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we strip away the adversary’s knowledge of graph structure and
the agents’ identities. In this scenario, we demonstrate that the adversary can never benefit from
broadcasting the desirable convention x, and the complete adoption of the inferior convention
is a best case scenario for the adversary. Our main findings identify the fraction of adversarial
influence that is necessary to accomplish this goal under both a deterministic and random
adversarial influence strategy.
The value of this characterization is that it begins to shed light on how the information
available to the adversary can influence the adversary’s ability to harm the system.
3
Chapter 2
Model and Summary of Results
2.1 The Model
We consider the framework of graphical coordination games where there exists a set of
agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} that interact with other agents in a pairwise fashion over a given
graph. Each agent i ∈ N has an action set Ai = {x, y} and interacts with a set of neighboring
agentsNi ⊆ N . Agent i ∈ N derives a benefit from each neighbor j ∈ Ni, and the value of the
benefit depends on their respective action choices ai, aj ∈ {x, y} according to the following
symmetric payoff matrix V : {x, y}2 → R2
Agent i
Agent j
x y
x 1 + α, 1 + α 0, 0
y 0, 0 1, 1
Payoff Matrix
where the payoff gain α > 0 is a parameter that captures the benefit of coordinating on action
x as opposed to action y. In a graphical coordination game, the utility of agent i, denoted by
4
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Ui : A → R, is merely the total payoff derived from the pairwise interactions, i.e.,
Ui(ai, a−i) =
∑
j∈Ni
V (ai, aj), (2.1)
whereA = A1×· · ·×An denotes the set of joint actions and a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an)
denotes the actions of all agents other than agent i. Finally, we measure the quality of a joint
action profile a ∈ A as
W (a) =
∑
i∈N
Ui(a). (2.2)
It is straightforward to see that for any graph G defined by any neighbor sets {Ni}i∈N , the
all-x action profile, denoted ~x := (x, . . . , x), is a (pure) Nash equilibrium and maximizes W .
Note that ~y := (y, . . . , y) is also a Nash equilibrium, but that it does not maximize W ; other
sub-optimal equilibria may exist as well depending on the graph structure.
2.2 Log-linear Learning
It is well-known that there exist distributed learning dynamics that converge to the action
profile that maximizes W (a), irrespective of the graphG and the structure of the agents’ action
setsAi ⊆ {x, y} [8,19,20]. For such settings, the all x action profile is not necessarily optimal.
A learning algorithm produces a sequence of joint action a(0), a(1), . . . , a(t), . . . , when the
action profile at any time t > 0 is chosen according to a given rule. The learning algorithm
known as log-linear learning [11, 13, 21] chooses an action profile at time t in the following
way:
• Select any agent i ∈ N with uniform probability.
5
Model and Summary of Results Chapter 2
• Agent i selects their action at time t probabilistically according to
Pr [ai(t) = x] =
eβUi(x,a−i(t−1))
eβUi(x,a−i(t−1)) + eβUi(y,a−i(t−1))
,
Pr [ai(t) = y] =
eβUi(y,a−i(t−1))
eβUi(x,a−i(t−1)) + eβUi(y,a−i(t−1))
,
where β > 0 is a given algorithm parameter.
• All other agents repeat their previous action, i.e., a−i(t) = a−i(t− 1).
For any β > 0, the log-linear learning process is known to induce an ergodic Markov process
over state space A, where the unique stationary distribution piβ = {piaβ}a∈A ∈ ∆(A) is
piaβ =
e
β
2
W (a)∑
a˜∈A e
β
2
W (a˜)
. (2.3)
The limiting distribution pi := limβ→∞ piβ exists and is unique [13]. If an action profile a′ is
in the support of the limiting distribution (i.e., pia′ > 0), it is known as a stochastically stable
equilibrium of the game for log-linear learning [22]. In the nominal game described in this
thesis, the set of stochastically stable equilibria is precisely the action profiles that maximize
W , namely the all-x action profile ~x.
2.3 Adversarial Influence and Summary of Results
We consider a scenario where there is an adversary which can impersonate up to k ≤ n
counterfeit agents in the graphical coordination game, thereby modifying the payoffs received
by the system’s agents in an effort to influence the system’s agents to choose specific actions.
Specifically, the adversary can select two sets Sx, Sy ⊆ N with Sx ∩ Sy = ∅, where Sx
(respectively Sy) represents the set of agents who are connected to a counterfeit agent that is
playing a fixed action x (respectively y). In this revised setting, the utility of any agent i ∈ N
6
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is now of the form
U˜i(ai, a−i)=

∑
j∈Ni V (ai, aj)+V (ai, x) if i ∈ Sx,∑
j∈Ni V (ai, aj)+V (ai, y) if i ∈ Sy,∑
j∈Ni V (ai, aj) otherwise.
(2.4)
That is, an agent i ∈ Sx (respectively i ∈ Sy) receives its usual payoffs from its neighbors in
Ni as well as an additional payoff of 1 + α if ai = x (respectively, 1 if ai = y).
In order to compare the performance of configurations on graphs of different sizes, we
introduce the efficiency η of a configuration. Efficiency is the ratio of the quality of some
action profile a to the quality of the optimal configuration on the same graph:
η(a) =
W (a)
maxaW (a)
. (2.5)
The optimal configuration for a graph of any size is the all-x state ~x. Hence, we have that
η(a) = W (a)
2(1+α)n
.
The central question that we seek to address in this thesis is the following: given a graph
G and constraints on the level of adversarial influence of the form |Sx| + |Sy| ≤ k ≤ n, what
are the adversarial influence sets Sx and Sy that minimize the efficiency η of the stochastically
stable state associated with the log-linear learning process operating on the influenced utility
functions given in (2.4)?
The main results of the paper include the following:
— In Theorems 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.4, and 4.1.5 we show how a well-informed adversary with var-
ious capabilities can minimize the efficiency of the stochastically stable state in a ring graph. A
key feature here is that the adversary optimally influences a small number of agents to play the
superior x action and others to play y, as this results in some agents failing to coordinate with
one another, driving down the efficiency. Given payoff gain α and a fractional adversarial bud-
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get γ = k/n, an informed adversary with basic capabilities can use Theorem 4.1.1 to determine
the minimal efficiency action profile capable of being stochastically stable when the adversary
best utilizes its resources. Then, the adversary can use Theorem 4.1.2 to construct the necessary
adversary set to accomplish stability of the profile. Theorem 4.1.3 subsequently proves a tight
bound on the effectiveness of this influence. Similarly, an informed adversary with complex
capabilities can use Theorem 4.1.4 to determine the minimal efficiency action profile capable
of being stochastically stable when the adversary best utilizes its resources. Then, the adver-
sary can use Theorem 4.1.5 to construct the necessary adversary sets to accomplish stability
of the profile. Theorem 4.1.6 subsequently proves a tight bound on the effectiveness of this
influence.
— In Theorem 4.2.1, we show that if the adversary cannot observe the indices of the agents,
this renders the adversary incapable of targeting specific action profiles. Here, the oblivious
adversary’s optimal action is simply to attempt to influence the agents to choose the all-y
state ~y. We show a similar limit on efficiency here, though in this case the adversary can be
considerably less effective.
— Theorem 4.2.2 considers a case in which the adversary cannot observe the indices of the
agents, and attempts to compensate for this by influencing the agents in a random “mobile”
way, randomly changing the influence sets at each time step. Here, we show again that the
adversary should never influence agents to play x, and that the adversary’s maximum influence
is similar to that of the oblivious adversary. However, in this case the adversary’s influence
is totally independent of the number of agents it can influence. We summarize our results
quantitatively in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: The minimum efficiency of any action profile capable of being stabilized in the stationary
informed, mobile informed, stationary oblivious, and mobile random oblivious cases for fixed α, where
γ = k/n is the fractional adversary budget. In the stationary and mobile informed case, the adversary
can stabilize a sub-optimal action profile for any 0 < γ ≤ 1. In the stationary oblivious case, the
adversary is more limited and can stabilize a sub-optimal action profile for any α < γ ≤ 1. The
informed adversary can always stabilize some profile with equal or less efficiency than its oblivious
counterpart. A random mobile oblivious adversary can stabilize sub-optimal profiles for any value of
γ > 0 and α < 0.5.
9
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Preliminaries
3.1 Potential Games
We begin by reviewing a class of games, termed potential games [23], that are intimately
related to the class of graphical coordination games.
Definition 3.1.1 A game (N,A, {Ui}i∈N) is a potential game if there exists a potential function
φ : A → R such that for any action profile a ∈ A, agent i ∈ N , and action a′i ∈ Ai,
Ui(ai, a−i)− Ui(a′i, a−i) = φ(ai, a−i)− φ(a′i, a−i). (3.1)
An interesting facet of potential games is that the stationary distribution associated with
log-linear learning for any potential game can be expressed in terms of the potential function
as
pia =
eβφ(a)∑
a˜∈A e
βφ(a˜)
(3.2)
for any β > 0. Hence, the support of the limiting distribution (and thus the set of stochastically
stable equilibria) is equal to the set of maximizers of the potential function φ, and we will use
10
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this characterization extensively in the forthcoming arguments.
For the graphical coordination game without adversaries specified by agent utilities as de-
fined in (2.1), it is well-known that this game is a potential game with potential function
φ(a) =
1
2
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ni
V (ai, aj) =
W (a)
2
, (3.3)
irrespective of the underlying graph structure or the parameter α. Accordingly, this fact gives
rise to the stationary distribution given in (2.3) by substituting (3.3) into (3.2). On the other
hand, the graphical coordination game with adversaries, i.e., agent utilities as defined in (2.4),
is also a potential game where the potential function is now of the form
φ(a;Sx, Sy) =
W (a)
2
+
∑
i∈Sx
V (ai, x) +
∑
i∈Sy
V (ai, y). (3.4)
For this case, the optimizers of (3.4) will now consist of the stochastically stable states.
3.2 Resistance Trees
We now review resistance tree arguments, which must be employed in the case that Sx and
Sy are allocated dynamically as functions of the action profile a of the system. In this case,
potential game arguments cannot be used to determine the stochastically stable state of the
system, and resistance tree arguments must be used instead. For a detailed review of resistance
trees, see [22].
Let P 0 be the probability transition matrix for a finite state Markov chain over state space
A. Denote the recurrent classes of P 0 as E1, E2, . . . , EN where each class is a collection of
action profiles. For each pair of distinct recurrent classesEi andEj , i 6= j, an ij-path is defined
to be a sequence of distinct states ζ = (zi → z2 → · · · → zn) such that z1 ∈ Ei and zn ∈ Ej .
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The resistance r(zu → zv) is given by
r(zu → zv) = [W (zv)−W (zu)]+ , (3.5)
where [·]+ is the projection onto the positive orthant. The resistance of path ζ is given by the
sum of the resistance of its edges, such that r(ζ) = r(z1 → z2) + r(z2 → z3) + · · ·+ r(zn−1 →
zn). Let ρij = min r(ζ) be the least resistance over all ij-paths ζ .
Now construct a complete directed graph withN vertices, one for each recurrent class. The
vertex corresponding to class Ej will be called j. The weight on the directed edge i → j is
ρij . A tree, T , rooted at vertex j is a set of N − 1 directed edges such that from every vertex
different from j, there is a unique directed path in the tree to j. The resistance of a rooted tree,
T , is the sum of the resistances ρij on theN−1 edges that compose it. The stochastic potential,
ψj , of the recurrent class Ej is defined to be the minimum resistance over all trees rooted at j.
The support of the limiting distribution (and thus the set of stochastically stable equilibria) is
given by states contained in the recurrent classes with minimum stochastic potential:
piβ = {Ei|i ∈ arg min
j
ψj}. (3.6)
3.3 Adversary Models
To capture the difference in the complexity of adversaries, we will use two different mod-
els for determining the abilities of the adversary. A simple adversary may only be able to
select fixed adversary sets Sx and Sy and use those sets for all action profiles of the system
it encounters. We call such an adversary stationary, and use potential game arguments to de-
termine the stochastically stable states of a system influenced by an adversary of this variety.
A more complex adversary may be able to take a dynamic approach and adjust the adversary
12
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sets Sx and Sy depending on the action profile it observes. These adversaries employ policies
S : A → Sx, Sy that map each possible action profile to an adversary set, and will be referred
to as mobile adversaries. To determine the stochastically stable states of a system attacked by
a mobile adversary, resistance tree arguments will be used.
Suppose an adversary knows the identities of each agent and can influence each specific
agent with a particular action. We call such an adversary informed.
Here, for a graph with |N | = n, a stationary informed adversary’s goal is to select the
influence sets Sx ⊆ N and Sy ⊆ N , where Sx ∩ Sy = ∅ and |Sx|+ |Sy| ≤ k, that minimize
ηSI(α, n, k) := min
Sx,Sy
max
a∗∈argmaxφ(a;Sx,Sy)
η(a∗). (3.7)
Similarly, a mobile informed adversary’s goal is to select the adversary policy S(α), where Sx
and Sy are functions of the action profile a of the system, that minimize
ηMI(α, n, k) := min
Sx(a),Sy(a)
max
a∗∈{Ei|i∈argmin
j
ψj}
η(a∗). (3.8)
We wish to characterize how adversarial knowledge of the graph G impacts the degree to
which the adversary can influence the stochastically stable state. To address this, suppose the
adversary knows the agents form a ring graph, but cannot observe the identities of the agents.
We call such an adversary oblivious, and model this by assuming that the adversary cannot
directly select influence sets Sx and Sy, but rather can only choose the sizes kx := |Sx| and
ky := |Sy|. A stationary oblivious adversary seeks to minimize
ηSO(α, n, k) := min
kx,ky∈Z+
kx+ky≤k
max
Sx,Sy⊆N
|Sx|=kx
|Sy |=ky
max
a∗∈argmaxφ(a;Sx,Sy)
η(a∗). (3.9)
A mobile informed adversary assigns adversary allocations to each set as a function of the
13
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action profile a and seeks to minimize
ηMO(α, n, k) := min
kx(a),ky(a)∈Z+
kx(a)+ky(a)≤k
max
Sx,Sy⊆N
|Sx|=kx(a)
|Sy |=ky(a)
max
a∗∈{Ei|i∈argmin
j
ψj}
η(a∗). (3.10)
Our analysis will primarily be concerned with understanding the maximum damage an
adversary can cause for large n. As such, we express results in terms of the fraction of agents
that the adversary can influence, which we denote by γ := k/n ∈ [0, 1] and call the adversary’s
budget. The minimum efficiency a stationary informed adversary can induce is thus
ηSI(α, γ) := lim inf
n→∞
ηSI (α, n, bγnc) , (3.11)
the minimum efficiency a mobile informed adversary can induce is
ηMI(α, γ) := lim inf
n→∞
ηMI (α, n, bγnc) , (3.12)
the minimum efficiency a stationary oblivious adversary can induce is
ηSO(α, γ) := lim inf
n→∞
ηSO (α, n, bγnc) , (3.13)
and the minimum efficiency a mobile oblivious adversary can induce is
ηMO(α, γ) := lim inf
n→∞
ηMO (α, n, bγnc) . (3.14)
14
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Our Contributions
In this section we characterize the solutions to (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9) in the context of ring
graphs with a large number of agents n, where an adversary can influence at most a γ ∈ [0, 1]
fraction of agents in the graph. By ring graph, we mean that the neighbor set of each agent
i ∈ N isNi = {i−1, i+1}. All forthcoming arithmetic on agent indices will be mod n where
appropriate.
4.1 The Influence of Informed Adversaries
Our first result is for the case that the adversary has full knowledge about the graph and the
identities of the agents, and thus can solve (3.7).
Theorem 4.1.1 Given payoff gain α, adversarial budget γ ≥ α, and sufficiently-large n, the
15
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minimum efficiency an informed adversary can induce (in the sense of (3.11)) is given by
ηSI(α, γ) =
min
`x1 ,`x2 ,`y1 ,`y2
1
1 + α
(
1+
(2 + α)( s1
s2
−1) + α(`x1− s1s2 `x2)
`x1+`y1− s1s2 (`x2+`y2)
)
s.t.
`x1 , `x2 ≥ 2
`y1 , `y2 ≥ max
{
2 + α
1− α, 3
}
`xκ , `yκ ∈ Z+
sκ=γ(`xκ+`yκ)−bα(`yκ+1)c−
⌊[
2− α(`xκ − 1)
1 + α
]
+
⌋
−4
s1 ≥ 0
s2 < 0 (4.1)
where [·]+ is the projection onto the positive orthant.
By solving the optimization problem in Theorem 4.1.1, it is also possible to determine
the exact optimal structure of the adversary’s influence sets Sx and Sy, as described in Theo-
rem 4.1.2:
Theorem 4.1.2 Given payoff gain α and adversarial budget γ, let `∗x1 , `
∗
x2
, `∗y1 and `
∗
y2
be the
optimizers of (4.1). For each κ ∈ {1, 2}, let sκ be defined in terms of `∗xκ and `yκ as in (4.1),
and choose integers r1, r2 ∈ Z+ to satisfy r1s1 + r2s2 = 0. Let mxκ :=
⌊[
2−α(`xκ−1)
1+α
]
+
⌋
+ 1.
The optimal informed adversary policy constructs influence sets Sx and Sy out of prototypical
influence sets (denoted S1x, S
2
x, S
1
y , S
2
y ) that repeat along the ring graph in a specific pattern.
For each of the following, let i denote an arbitrary agent. First, Sκx = {i, . . . , i+mxκ − 1} (if
mxκ = 0, then Sκx = ∅). Similarly, there exists a heuristic for constructing the set Sy outlined
16
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in Lemma A.1.3 in the Appendix. Then repeat each S1x and S
1
y r1 times, repeat S
2
x and S
2
y r2
times, and then repeat the overall pattern continually. This results in influencing the agents
with the following overall pattern of actions:
(
`∗x1 agents︷ ︸︸ ︷
xx · · ·x)(
`∗y1 agents︷ ︸︸ ︷
yy · · · y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
repeated r1 times
(
`∗x2 agents︷ ︸︸ ︷
xx · · ·x)(
`∗y2 agents︷ ︸︸ ︷
yy · · · y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
repeated r2 times︸ ︷︷ ︸
repeated indefinitely
· · · (4.2)
We illustrate the results of these theorems in the following example:
Example 4.1.1 Consider a ring graph with n = 33 agents as depicted in Figure 4.1. Let
payoff gain α = 1/3 − , where  → 0+. Suppose the adversary can attack with k = 22 so
that γ = 2/3. In this case, the solution to the optimization problem (4.1) is `∗x1 = 2, `
∗
y1
= 11,
`∗y2 = 5, and `
∗
x2
= 2, with the associated s1 = 2/3 and s2 = −4/3. A choice of r1 and r2
which satisfies r1s1 + r2s2 = 0 is to set r1 = 2 and r2 = 1.
Thus, to cause the maximum harm to the system, the adversary should influence the agents
in two repeating patterns with actions of the form x . . . xy · · · y; the first should have lengths
`∗x1 = 2, `
∗
y1
= 11, with
⌊
α(`∗y1 + 1)
⌋
+
⌊[
2−α(`∗x1−1)
1+α
]
+
⌋
+ 4 = 8 agents influenced and be
repeated r1 = 2 times, and the second should have lengths `∗x2 = 2, `y2 = 5 with
⌊
α(`∗y2 + 1)
⌋
+⌊[
2−α(`∗x2−1)
1+α
]
+
⌋
+ 4 = 6 agents influenced and be repeated r2 = 1 times. These patterns, as
well as the exact influence sets, are all depicted visually in Figure 4.1.
The efficiency of the resulting stochastically stable action profile is ηSI(1/3, 2/3) = 7
11
≈
0.636, considerably lower than the efficiency of the all-y state on the same graph: η(~y) =
3/4 = 0.75.
The minimum efficiency ηSI(α, γ) in general admits no closed-form expression. However,
by relaxing the integrality constraint in (4.1), we can obtain a lower bound on the efficiency
resulting from the influence of a stationary informed adversary.
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Figure 4.1: Example 4.1.1: An informed adversary’s optimal attack on a 33-agent ring when α =
1/3 − ,  → 0+ and k = 22 (i.e., γ = 2/3). The optimal attack partitions the agents into two groups
of 13 (attacking each of these with 8 adversaries) and one of 7 (attacking this with 6 adversaries). The
colors show the three different groups of agents under influence, the bold letters depict the actions being
influenced by the adversary, and the open circles indicate agents that are not being attacked.
Theorem 4.1.3 The lower bound on the achievable efficiency η∗ of a system with some payoff
gain α and adversarial budget γ is given by:
ηSI
∗
(α, γ) =

1− 1
1+α
γ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ α
2+2α+α2−γ−αγ
2+3α+α2
, α < γ < b(α)
−2−2α+α2
(−4+α)(1+α) , b(α) ≤ γ ≤ 1
(4.3)
where
b(α) =
−2(2 + α2)
(−4 + α)(1 + α) .
Our next set of results are for the case where the adversary is mobile and has full knowledge
about the graph and the identities of the agents. Although the proof techniques are different,
the results in this case are very similar to the stationary informed case except the key difference
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is that a mobile informed adversary can cause the same amount of damage with a significantly
lower adversary budget. We present a slightly modified version of 4.1.1 for mobile informed
adversaries:
Theorem 4.1.4 Given payoff gain α, adversarial budget γ ≥ α, and sufficiently-large n, the
minimum efficiency a mobile informed adversary can induce (in the sense of (3.11)) is given
by the solution to the following optimization problem:
ηMI(α, γ) =
min
`x1 ,`x2 ,`y1 ,`y2
1
1 + α
(
1+
(2 + α)( s1
s2
−1) + α(`x1− s1s2 `x2)
`x1+`y1− s1s2 (`x2+`y2)
)
s.t.
`x1 , `x2 ≥ 2
`y1 , `y2 ≥ max
{
2 + α
1− α, 3
}
`xκ , `yκ ∈ Z+
sκ=

γ(`xκ+`yκ)− 4 if `xκ = 2 and α < 0.5
γ(`xκ+`yκ)− 2 else
s1 ≥ 0
s2 < 0. (4.4)
By solving the optimization problem in Theorem 4.1.4, it is also possible to determine
the exact optimal structure of the adversary’s policy S : A → Sx, Sy, as described in Theo-
rem 4.1.5:
Theorem 4.1.5 Given payoff gain α and adversarial budget γ, let `∗x1 , `
∗
x2
, `∗y1 and `
∗
y2
be the
optimizers of (4.4). For each κ ∈ {1, 2}, let sκ be defined in terms of `∗xκ and `yκ as in (4.4),
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and choose integers r1, r2 ∈ Z+ to satisfy r1s1+r2s2 = 0. Let ak be the action profile obtained
by appending `xk agents who play x to `yk agents who play y. Then, an action profile a can
be constructed by appending together r1 instances of a1 and r2 instances of a2. The adversary
should then use an aggressive policy, outlined in Definition B.1.5 in Appendix B, with target a
in order to stabilize the action profile with minimal possible efficiency.
The minimum efficiency ηMI(α, γ) in general admits no closed-form expression. However,
by relaxing the integrality constraint in (4.1), we can obtain a lower bound on the efficiency
resulting from the influence of a mobile informed adversary.
Theorem 4.1.6 The lower bound on the achievable efficiency ηMI∗ of a system with some pay-
off gain α and adversarial budget γ is given by:
ηMI
∗
(α, γ) = 

2−γ(1+α)
2(1+α)
0≤γ≤b(α)
m(y−b(α))+ηMI∗1 (α, b(α)) b(α)<γ<c(α)
4−2c(α)+αc(α)
4(1+α)
c(α)≤γ≤ 1
α≤ 1
2
,

2−2γ+αγ
2(1+α)
0<γ≤b(α)
2−2b(α)+αb(α)
2(1+α)
0<γ≤b(α)
else,
(4.5)
where
m =
ηMI
∗
2 − ηMI∗1
c(α)− b(α) ,
ηMI
∗
1 (α, b(α)) =
2− b(α)(1 + α)
2(1 + α)
,
ηMI
∗
2 (α, c(α)) =
4− 2c(α) + αc(α)
4(1 + α)
,
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b(α) =

2α
1+3α
α ≤ 1
4
,
2α(1−α)
1+α+α2
1
4
< α ≤ 1
2
,
2(1−α)
4−α else,
and
c(α) =

4
5
α ≤ 1
4
,
4(1−α)
4−α else.
4.2 The Influence of Oblivious Adversaries
When the adversary has no knowledge of the indices of the agents in the graph, the ad-
versary effectively cannot employ specifically-targeted influence sets such as those described
in Theorem 4.1.2. Instead, an oblivious adversary solves the optimization problem (3.9) by
specifying merely the number of agents it influences with each action. That is, an oblivious
adversary chooses kx, ky ∈ Z+ to minimize the efficiency of stochastically-stable equilibria in
worst case over feasible influence sets satisfying |Sx| = kx and |Sy| = ky.
Theorem 4.2.1 Given payoff gain α and adversary budget γ, the minimum efficiency a sta-
tionary oblivious adversary can induce (in the sense of (3.13)) is
ηSO(α, γ) =

1
1+α
α < γ,
1 α ≥ γ.
(4.6)
This is achieved by choosing kx = 0 and ky = bγnc.
Theorem 4.2.1 shows that an adversary who cannot observe agent indices should never in-
fluence any agent to play the x action. Thus, we see that an informed adversary can leverage its
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detailed information to incentivize detailed, heterogeneous, highly-inefficient configurations;
an oblivious adversary must be content with incentivizing the all-y configuration ~y.
Similarly, in the case of mobile oblivious adversaries, the adversary should never influence
an agent to play x. This allows us to leverage known results for mobile adversaries to state the
following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.2 For any payoff gain α and adversary capability k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, when
agent indices are unknown to the adversary, the optimal adversary allocation (in the sense
of (3.8)) has kx = 0 and ky = k. The resulting efficiency is
ηMO(α, n, k) =

1
1+α
α < 1
2
1 α ≥ 1
2
.
(4.7)
Note that (4.7) gives the influenced efficiency as independent of k (that is, independent
of γ), which suggests an important qualitative difference between deterministic (stationary)
adversaries and probabilistic (mobile) ones: an adversary with low γ can influence behavior
far more effectively if it is capable of employing a mobile, randomized strategy when compared
with a fixed, deterministic one.
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Simulations
The results obtained from running the optimizations posed in Theorems 4.1.1 and 4.1.4 with
varying α and γ values have been compiled in Table 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. Our results have
also been compiled graphically in Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 where α is held at a constant value
while γ varies.
There are several notable trends to discuss. When 0 < α < 1, achievable system efficiency
decreases as adversarial budget γ increases. Additionally, the value of α only has a small effect
on the minimum achievable efficiency relative to the role that γ has. Regardless of the value
of α, if γ = 1, the system operates at nearly half efficiency with lower efficiency achieved at
higher α values.
The efficiency of the most damaging action profile a mobile informed adversary can sta-
bilize will always be the same or less than the most damaging profile a stationary informed
adversary can stabilize. Thus, mobile adversaries are more capable of decreasing system ef-
ficiency in all scenarios. However, when γ → 1, both types of informed adversary achieve
the same minimum efficiency. A mobile informed adversary cannot stabilize any profile with
efficiency worse than the worst efficiency action profile a stationary informed adversary can
stabilize with γ = 1, however the mobile informed adversary is capable of stabilizing this
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profile at a significantly lower γ value.
When α is small, there is a noticeable gap between the minimum realizable efficiency and
the minimum efficiency bound. This discrepancy stems from the integer constraint set forth in
Theorems 4.1.1 and 4.1.4.
Figure 5.1: Minimum achievable efficiency as a function of fractional adversarial budget γ, α = 0.3.
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Figure 5.2: Minimum achievable efficiency as a function of fractional adversarial budget γ, α = 0.6.
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Figure 5.3: Minimum achievable efficiency as a function of fractional adversarial budget γ, α = 0.9.
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Stationary Informed Adversary
γ `x1 `y1 `x2 `y2 r η η
∗
α = 0.3
0.2 12 102 95 102 1.43 0.845 0.844
0.5 4 5 4 12 0.42 0.693 0.680
0.8 2 5 4 5 0.15 0.598 0.549
1 2 4 - - - 0.552 0.522
α = 0.6
0.2 102 52 102 32 0.54 0.874 0.873
0.5 5 107 94 107 0.30 0.685 0.684
0.8 2 7 2 37 0.13 0.555 0.545
1 2 7 - - - 0.528 0.522
α = 0.9
0.2 202 60 202 30 0.23 0.894 0.893
0.5 7 230 200 230 12.6 0.734 0.734
0.8 5 230 57 230 0.93 0.575 0.575
1 2 30 - - - 0.508 0.508
Table 5.1: Minimum efficiency configuration characterizations for a stationary informed adversary at
various α and γ values. The value r is the number of instances of the second segment that will appear
for every instance of the first segment. η is the achieved efficiency, while η∗ is the lower bound on
efficiency.
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Mobile Informed Adversary
γ `x1 `y1 `x2 `y2 r η η
∗
α = 0.3
0.2 4 4 4 9 0.914 0.688 0.673
0.5 2 4 4 4 0.526 0.598 0.577
0.8 2 4 - - - 0.551 0.522
1 2 4 - - - 0.551 0.522
α = 0.6
0.2 2 7 2 18 0.54 0.541 0.541
0.5 2 7 - - - 0.528 0.522
0.8 2 7 - - - 0.528 0.522
1 2 7 - - - 0.528 0.522
α = 0.9
0.2 2 30 - - - 0.508 0.508
0.5 2 30 - - - 0.508 0.508
0.8 2 30 - - - 0.508 0.508
1 2 30 - - - 0.508 0.508
Table 5.2: Minimum efficiency configuration characterizations for a mobile informed adversary at var-
ious α and γ values for a mobile informed adversary. The value r is the number of instances of the
second segment that will appear for every instance of the first segment. η is the achieved efficiency,
while η∗ is the lower bound on efficiency.
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Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis has investigated the susceptibility of distributed learning rules to adversarial ma-
nipulation and shown analytic bounds on how much more damage a well-informed adversary
can cause than an oblivious one. Additionally, we have shown that an informed adversary that
is able to deploy complex strategies can do significantly more damage in many scenarios com-
pared to an adversary who can only deploy simple, fixed strategies. Finally, we have shown
that an adversary can employ a randomized approach to compensate for low capabilities.
Future work will involve posing the problem explicitly as a game between the adversary
and the system operator and understanding how the operator’s knowledge of the adversary’s
capability can inform various approaches to security.
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Stationary Informed Adversaries
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1.1
Before delving into the proof, we begin by introducing some convenient notation. First, for
any set S ⊆ N and action profile a ∈ A, let aS = {ai : i ∈ S} correspond to the action choices
associated with the group S in the action profile a. Accordingly, we extend the definition of
φ(a) (and similarly φ(a;Sx, Sy)) to be restricted to the set S as
φ(aS) =
1
2
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩S
V (ai, aj). (A.1)
Lastly, note that any action profile consists of alternating contiguous x and y segments of
varying lengths. Without loss of generality, we consider the case where a1 = x and an = y,
unless of course the action profile is of the form a = (x, . . . , x) = ~x or a = (y, . . . , y) = ~y.
Accordingly, we will represent an action profile by the length of the contiguous components,
i.e., (`1x, `
1
y, `
2
x, `
2
y, . . . , `
m
x , `
m
y ), where each `
k
x, `
k
y ≥ 1 and there are m different segments in
the corresponding ring graph. In relation to the action profile a, this means that ai = x for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , `1x}, ai = y for all i ∈ {`1x + 1, . . . , `1x + `1y}, and so forth. By definition, we have
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that `1x+ · · ·+`mx +`1y+ · · ·+`my = n. Finally, we let ~`x = {`1x, . . . , `mx } and ~`y = {`1y, . . . , `my }.
We begin with a useful lemma that provides a characterization of the potential difference
between two different action profiles.
Lemma A.1.1 Let a and a′ be any two action profiles. If ai = a′i for all players in a given a
set S ⊆ N , then the potential difference satisfies
φ(a)− φ(a′) = φ(aS)− φ(a′S) +
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni/S
(
V (ai, aj)− V (ai, a′j)
)
, (A.2)
where a−S is shorthand notation for aN\S .
Proof: First, note that the potential function for any a and set S ⊆ N can be expressed
as
φ(a) = φ(aS) +
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni/S
V (ai, aj) + φ(a−S), (A.3)
which follows from the fact that
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni\S
V (ai, aj) =
∑
i∈N/S
∑
j∈Ni∩S
V (ai, aj) (A.4)
from the symmetry in V and the fact that j ∈ Ni implies i ∈ Nj . The result follows by noting
that φ(aS) = φ(aS)′ for the considered action profiles.
Our next lemma rules out certain configurations as candidates for stochastically stable equi-
libria.
Lemma A.1.2 Let a be any action profile with corresponding length vectors ~`x and ~`y and
adversarial sets Sx and Sy. If a is stochastically stable, then `kx ≥ 2 and `ky ≥ 3 for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof: We will prove this claim by demonstrating that any instance xyx, xyyx, or yxy
can never be stabilized for any choice of Sx and Sy. We begin by focusing on the case xyx,
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meaning that there exists a set of agents S = {i, i + 1, i + 2} such that aS = (x, y, x). Now,
consider the profile a′ = (a′S, a−S) where a
′
S = (x, x, x). From (A.2), we know that
φ(a, Sxy)− φ(a′, Sxy) = φ(aS, Sxy)− φ(a′S, Sxy), (A.5)
where we use the shorthand notation Sxy = (Sx, Sy). First, we know that for any sets Sx and
Sy,
φ(a, Sxy) ≤ 1 + 2(1 + α), (A.6)
which is achieved when {i, i+ 2} ∈ Sx and {i+ 1} ∈ Sy. Likewise, we know that for any sets
Sx and Sy,
φ(a′, Sxy) ≥ 4(1 + α)). (A.7)
Consequently, φ(a, Sxy) < φ(a′, Sxy). Hence a is not stochastically stable. Similar arguments
can be constructed for the other cases as well.
Our next lemma begins the process of understanding how many adversaries are necessary
to stabilize y-segments of varying length. Before stating the lemma, we introduce the following
notation. For a given action profile a with accompanying length vectors ~`x and ~`y, let Q(`kx) ⊆
N capture the `kx contiguous player indices in the k-th x component. Q(`
k
y) ⊆ N is defined
identically.
Lemma A.1.3 Let a be any action profile with corresponding length vectors ~`x and ~`y and
adversarial sets Sx and Sy. If a is the unique stochastically stable, then for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
|Q(`ky) ∩ Sx|+ |Q(`ky) ∩ Sy| ≥
⌊
α(`ky + 1)
⌋
+ 3. (A.8)
Furthermore, the Sx and Sy that minimizes |Q(`ky)∩Sx|+ |Q(`ky)∩Sy| and makes a the unique
stochastically stable state achieves this bound with equality.
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Proof: Let Q(`ky) = {i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ `ky − 1} for simplicity. Note that ai−1 = ai+`ky = x
by definition. Accordingly, for ease of presentation we will drop player indices and express
such a string as merely xy`
k
yx. Note that the potential function associated with this segment is
φ
(
xy(`
k
y)x;Sxy
)
= (`ky − 1) + |Q(`ky) ∩ Sy|. (A.9)
Alternatively, the potential of this section if all members of group Q(`ky) switched their choice
from y to x would be
φ
(
xx(`
k
y)x;Sxy
)
≥ (1 + α)(`ky + 1), (A.10)
where we get equality if Q(`ky) ∩ Sx = ∅. If a is the unique stochastically stable state, then we
know that
φ
(
xy(`
k
y)x;Sxy
)
> φ
(
xx(`
k
y)x;Sxy
)
, (A.11)
which results in (A.8). We will now switch to establishing sufficiency. That is, we can ensure
that the segment xy(`
k
y)x is the unique stochastically stable state through the appropriate design
of Sx and Sy with the property that |Q(`ky)∩Sx| = 0 and |Q(`ky)∩Sy| = bα(`ky+1)c+3. Before
specifying a particular Sx and Sy, we begin by identifying a series of necessary conditions that
ensure the action profile a is the unique stochastically state. We then proceed to demonstrate
the sufficiency of these conditions. To that end, the different configurations that we need to
consider for the segment Q(`ky) = {i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ `ky − 1} are as follows:
• Case #1: y(c)x(d)y(e), c, d, e > 0, c + d + e = `ky , which shall be referred to as a cluster
of x within Q(`ky),
• Case #2: x(c)y(`ky−c) or y(c)x(`ky−c), 0 < c < `ky − 1, which shall be referred to as a cluster
of x on the edge of Q(`ky),
• Case #3: Some combination of clusters of x within and on the edge of Q(`ky).
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We begin with Case #1. To ensure that the configuration y(`
k
y) has strictly higher potential
than any cluster of x within Q(`ky) we will conduct the same potential function analysis done
previously. Let T1 ⊂ Q(`ky) be the set of agents that switch to x in the configuration y(c)x(d)y(e).
Inspecting the potential function evaluated at these action profiles gives us
φ(y(`
k
y)) = `ky − 1 + |Sy ∩Q(`ky)|
φ(ycxdye) ≥ `ky − d− 2 + (1 + α)(d− 1)
+|Sy ∩Q(`ky) \ T |.
If φ(y(`
k
y)) > φ(ycxdye), then combining the above equations gives us that
|Sy ∩ T1| > α(|T1| − 1)− 2. (A.12)
This represents our first condition that needs to be satisfied.
With regards to Case #2, the potential function for the segment x(c)y(`
k
y−c) satisfies
φ(x(c)y(`
k
y−c)) ≥ `ky − c− 1 + (1 + α)c+ |Sy ∩Q(`ky) \ T2|,
where T2 ⊂ Q(`ky) is once again the set of agents that switch to x in the configuration x(c)y(`ky−c).
Note that the other symmetric case is identical. If φ(y(`
k
y)) > φ(x(c)y(`
k
y−c)), then this gives us
|Sy ∩ T2| > α|T2|. (A.13)
This represents our second condition that needs to be satisfied.
With regards to Case #3, if there are some combination of clusters of x within and/or on
the edge of Q(`ky), this will merely require applying the conditions given in (A.12) and (A.13)
iteratively over each of the smaller segments that are of Case #1 or Case #2.
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We will now provide a minimal construction of the adversary sets Sy and Sx that will ensure
that the potential of the segment xy(`
k
y)x that satisfies the conditions given in Cases #1-3. First,
let Sx ∩Q(`ky) = ∅. Define the sets W1 and W2 as follows:
W1 = {w : bα(w − i+ 1)c − bα(w − i)c > 0}, (A.14)
W2 = {i, w, `ky − i+ 1}, (A.15)
where w = max(Q(`ky)/(W1 ∩ {`ky − i + 1})), i.e. the largest index that is neither in W1 or
`ky − i+ 1. Then, let Sy = W1 ∩W2.
This resulting adversary set satisfies the two conditions that have been set forth. In order to
show this, we need to determine the minimum number of adversaries that influence any group
of agents T1 within and T2 on the edge of Q(`ky).
For groups T2 that contain the agent i, the number of adversaries that influence the group
is given by bα|T2|c+ 1, which clearly satisfies (A.13).
The number of adversaries k that influence any group T1 can be lower bounded by taking
the difference in the number of adversaries that influence the group T ′2 and T
′′
2 , where T
′
2 is the
group that contains agent i and has the same largest index as T1 and T ′′2 is the largest group that
contains agent i but does not contain any agents that are in T1:
k ≥ bα(|T ′2| − |T ′′2 |)c . (A.16)
The size of T1 is given by taking the difference between T ′2 and T
′′
2 . Thus,
k ≥ bα(|T1|)c . (A.17)
This satisfies (A.12) for all T1.
We can apply a similar procedure to determine how many adversaries influence a group T2
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that contains the agent `ky − i+ 1. Groups of T2 that contain the agent `ky − i+ 1 but not agent
w will have an adversary influencing each agent. Groups of T2 that contain the agent `ky− i+ 1
and the agent w must be treated as a group T1 with an additional agent who is influenced by
an adversary. In addition, there is another guaranteed adversary on w that is not counted in
(A.17). Thus, for any group T2 that contains agent `ky − i+ 1,
k ≥

|T2| w /∈ T2,
bα(|T2| − 1)c+ 2 else.
(A.18)
Both of these cases satisfy (A.13).
Thus, Sy satisfies all conditions set forth in (A.12) and (A.13). The size of Sy is bounded
by |Sy| ≤
⌊
α`ky
⌋
+ 3. This does not necessarily satisfy (A.8), so additional adversaries need to
be added to arbitrary indexes within Q(`ky) until Sy is of sufficient size.
Lemma A.1.4 Let a be any action profile with corresponding length vectors ~`x and ~`y and
adversarial sets Sx and Sy. If a is the unique stochastically stable, then for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
|Q(`kx) ∩ Sx|+ |Q(`kx) ∩ Sy| ≥
⌊
2− α(`kx − 1)
1 + α
⌋
+ 1. (A.19)
Furthermore, the Sx and Sy that minimizes |Q(`kx)∩Sx|+ |Q(`kx)∩Sy| and makes a the unique
stochastically stable state achieves this bound with equality.
Proof: The proof follows similarly to the proof of Lemma A.1.3. Let Q(`kx) = {i, i +
1, . . . , i+ `kx − 1} for simplicity. Note that ai−1 = ai+`kx = y by definition.
The potential function associated with this segment is
φ
(
yx(`
k
x)y;Sxy
)
= (1 + α)(`kx − 1) + |Q(`kx) ∩ Sx|. (A.20)
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Alternatively, the potential of this section if all members of group Q(`kx) switched their choice
from x to y would be
φ
(
yy(`
k
x)y;Sxy
)
≥ `kx + 1, (A.21)
where we get equality if Q(`kx) ∩ Sy = ∅. If a is the unique stochastically stable state, then we
know that
φ
(
yx(`
k
x)y;Sxy
)
> φ
(
yy(`
k
x)y;Sxy
)
, (A.22)
which results in (A.19).
We will now switch to establishing sufficiency. That is, we can ensure that the segment
yx(`
k
x)y is the unique stochastically stable state through the appropriate design of Sx and Sy
with the property that |Q(`kx)∩Sy| = 0 and |Q(`kx)∩Sx| =
⌊
2−α(`kx−1)
1+α
⌋
+ 1. Before specifying
a particular Sx and Sy, we begin by identifying a series of necessary conditions that ensure the
action profile a is the unique stochastically state. We then proceed to demonstrate the suffi-
ciency of these conditions. To that end, the different configurations that we need to consider
for the segment Q(`kx) = {i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ `ky − 1} are as follows:
• Case #1: x(c)y(d)x(e), c, d, e > 0, c + d + e = `kx, which shall be referred to as a cluster
of y within Q(`kx),
• Case #2: y(c)x(`kx−c) or x(c)y(`kx−c), 0 < c < `kx − 1, which shall be referred to as a cluster
of y on the edge of Q(`kx),
• Case #3: Some combination of clusters of y within and on the edge of Q(`kx).
Configurations that belong to Case #1 and #2 will never be stochastically stable. Q(`kx) ∩
Sy = ∅, meaning that clusters of agents who play y within and on the side of Q(`kx) will not
satisfy (A.12) and (A.13) respectively.
With regards to Case #3, if there are some combination of clusters of y within and/or on
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the edge of Q(`kx), this will merely require applying the conditions given in (A.12) and (A.13)
iteratively over each of the smaller segments that are of Case #1 or Case #2.
Thus, (A.19) is the only condition that must be satisfied and can be done so by adding
adversaries to arbitrary indexes within Q(`kx) until Sx is of sufficient size.
Let us define some new notation. Consider a heterogeneous action profile a with partition
Q = {Q1, . . . , QM} and am = x(lxm )y(lym ). The vector ~`x = [`xm ] is defined such that if there
exists a Qm consisting of lxm agents that play x attached to lym agents that play y in a, then
`xm ∈ ~`x and `ym ∈ ~`y. Moreover, the number of partitions of form am = x(`xm )y(`ym ) in a is
denoted by rm, which form the repetition vector ~r.
The efficiency of an action profile described by ~`x, ~`y, and ~r is given by:
η( ~`x, ~`y, ~r) =
~rT ((1 + α)~x+ ~y)− (2 + α)||~r||1
(1 + α)~rT (~y + ~x)
. (A.23)
For the given ~`x and ~`y, define the vector ~sT = {s1, s2, . . . , sm}, where
sm = γ(`xm + `ym)− bα(`ym + 1)c
−
⌊[
2− α(`xm − 1)
1 + α
]
+
⌋
− 4.
(A.24)
For a given payoff gain α and budget γ, sm is the difference between the adversaries available
to a partition described by `xm and `ym and the minimum number of adversaries needed to
ensure the stochastic stability of that partition.
Lemma A.1.5 Let action profile a be described by some ~`x, ~`y, ~r, and ~s with ~rT~s > 0 and
efficiency η(~`x, ~`y, ~r). If there exists some combination of `xm and `ym with sm < 0 and
η(x(`xm )y(`ym )) < η(~`x, ~`y, ~r), then there exists an action profile with lower efficiency than
a with ~rT~s = 0.
Proof: Let action profile a be described by some ~`x, ~`y, ~r, and ~s with ~rT~s = b, b > 0 and
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efficiency η(a). Let `xm and `ym describe a segment with sm = c, c < 0 and η(x(`xm )y(`ym )) <
η(a). A new action profile a˜ can be constructed by repeating this additional segment − b
c
times
each time a is repeated, resulting in the following vectors:
~` ′
x =
 ~`x
`xm
 , ~` ′y =
 ~`y
`ym
 , ~r ′ =
 ~r
− b
c
 . (A.25)
From this, a new ~s ′ can be constructed, and ~r ′T~s ′ = 0. The efficiency of a˜ can be expressed as
a mediant sum. Let g(~`x, ~`y, ~r) = ~rT ((1 + α)~x+ ~y)−(2+α)||~r||1 and h(~`x, ~`y, ~r) = ~rT (~y+~x).
Then:
η(a˜) =
g(~`x, ~`y, ~r)− bcg(`xm , `ym , 1)
h(~`x, ~`y, ~r)− bch(`xm , `ym , 1)
. (A.26)
This is a mediant sum of η(a) and η(x(`xm )y(`ym )). Since η(x(`xm )y(`ym )) < η(a), the resulting
mediant sum will also be less than η(a). Thus, η(a˜) < η(a).
Lemma A.1.6 For a given payoff gain α, the profile of the form a = x(`x)y(`y) that has minimal
efficiency and is able to appear in a stochastically stable state is described by:
`x = 2 `y = min{l : l ∈ Z+, l ≥ bα(l + 1)c+ 3}. (A.27)
Proof: The minimum efficiency segment occurs when the strings of agents playing x and
y are as short as possible. The shortest strings can only be stabilized when the agents are under
full adversarial influence. The shortest string of x is two agents long when 0 < α < 1, while
the shortest string of y when each agent is influenced is given by
`y = min{l : l ∈ Z+, l ≥ bα(l + 1)c+ 3}. (A.28)
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Corollary A.1.1 When adversary capability γ = 1, The minimum efficiency configuration is
given by repeating the minimum efficiency segment outlined in Lemma A.1 indefinitely.
For any 1 > γ > 0, the minimum efficiency segment will have sm < 0. Hence, to minimize
η(a) when 1 > γ > 0, we can limit our search to configurations of the form a = ( ~`x, ~`y, ~r) that
minimize η( ~`x, ~`y, ~r) while utilizing all adversarial influence available, i.e., ~rT~s = 0.
Lemma A.1.7 Any heterogeneous minimum efficiency action profile satisfies | ~`x| ≤ 2 and
| ~`y| ≤ 2, i.e. at most two different lengths of groups of agents playing x and two different
lengths of groups of agents playing y will be repeated in the minimum efficiency action profile.
Proof: To prove this statement, it is sufficient to show that if an action profile a1 with
~`
x
1
= (`x1 , `x2 , `x3), ~`y
1
= (`y1 , `y2 , `y3) and ~s
1 = (s1, s2, s3), s1 > 0, s2, s3 < 0 there exists
another action profile a2 or a3 with ~`x
2
= (`x1 , `x2) and ~`y
2
= (`y1 , `y2) or ~`x
3
= (`x1 , `x3) and
~`
y
3
= (`y1 , `y3) that has an efficiency at least as low as that of a
1. Define pz = `yz − 1 + (1 +
α)(`xz − 1) and `z = `xz + `yz . We know that for a1 to be the minimum efficiency profile, we
must have (~r 1)T~s 1 = 0. Under this condition, we can write:
η(a1) =
r2(p2 − s2s1p1) + r3(p3 − s3s1p1)
(1 + α)(r2(`2 − s2s1 `1) + r3(`3 − s3s1 `1))
. (A.29)
For the other two action profiles a2 and a3, we know that r2 and r3 satisfy (~r i)T~s i = 0. From
this, we can write
η(a2) =
p2 − s2s1p1
(1 + α)(`2 − s2s1 `1)
, η(a3) =
p3 − s3s1p1
(1 + α)(`3 − s3s1 `1)
. (A.30)
We can see that η(a1) is a mediant sum of weighted values η(a2) and η(a3). Hence, either
η(a2) or η(a3) is less than or equal to η(a1). This result can be expanded to show that for any
stabilizable action profile that is made up of multiple subsets with sm ≥ 0 and multiple subsets
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with sm < 0, there exists an action profile with lower efficiency made up of just two kinds of
the subsets in the original action profile.
Thus, the search for a minimal efficiency configuration can be restricted to a search over four
lengths (two of segments of x, two of y) that satisfy the constraints on adversary set size and
complete adversary utilization.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1.3:
When the integer constraint in (4.1) is relaxed, the optimization can be simplified down to
one variable. In the original optimization, segments of agents playing y could be one of two
different lengths, as well as agents playing x. This condition existed to ensure that all available
adversaries were utilized. However, when the integer restriction is lifted, it is possible to always
utilize all adversaries when all segments of agents playing y are the same length, and all agents
playing x are also the same length. Furthermore, the condition that all adversaries are utilized
allows for `x to be solved for in terms of `y. When substituted into (A.23), the expression
simplifies into a function of α and γ.
The final expression is split into three regimes determined by γ. The first boundary, where
γ = α, arises from the use of the projection onto the positive orthant used to determine the
number of adversaries necessary to stabilize a segment of x. Specifically, for values of γ less
than α, it is necessary to use an x segment that does not require any adversaries to stabilize.
The second boundary at γ = b(α) arises from the restriction of one adversary to each agent.
At γ > b(α), the minimum efficiency segment can be stabilized.
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Mobile Informed Adversaries
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1.4
In the forthcoming section, we will describe action profiles relative to a desired “target”
action profile that we wish to be the sole stochastically stable state of the system. First, the
desired action profile a will be decomposed into segments of neighboring agents who all play
the same action profile. Let a = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm}, where each Ti is of the form {x, x, . . . , x}
or {y, y, . . . , y} and the segments alternate between all playing x and all playing y. Let Q(i)
refer to the agents whose actions are described by Ti.
Action profiles a′ that differ from the target profile will be described relative to the target.
Specifically, the segmentation scheme present in a will be applied to a′. For each Q(i), if
the agents all play the same action in a′, then that segment is referred to as homogeneous.
Similarly, if the agents in Q(i) do not all play the same action, segment i in a′ is referred to as
heterogeneous.
To describe the adversary policy that could be used to stabilize a desired target profile a,
we propose a policy that comprises of strategies applied to individual segments. Specifically,
the proposed policy includes “offensive” and “defensive” strategies that exist for each desired
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action of the segment, x or y.
Definition B.1.1 (Offensive x Strategy). Consider the agents u through v. Let [p, q] be the
longest chain of agents playing x within the interval [u, v]. A policy S : A → Sk uses an
offensive x strategy on the interval [u, v] if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. If a(w) 6= x, w ∈ [u, v], no agents in [u, v] play x, then Sx ∩ [u, v] ≥ 1. If agent u− 1 or
v + 1 are playing x, then u ∈ Sx or v ∈ Sx respectively. If i− 1 and j + 1 both play x,
it is sufficient to have either i ∈ Sx or j ∈ Sx.
2. Else, if [p, q] 6= [u, v], then {p− 1, q + 1} ∩ Sx ≥ 1.
Definition B.1.2 (Defensive x Strategy). Consider the agents u through v. Let [p, q] be the
longest chain of agents playing x within the interval [u, v]. A policy S : A → Sk uses a
defensive x strategy on the interval [u, v] if u− v + 1 < 1
α
and p 6= q, then {p, q} ∈ Sx.
Definition B.1.3 (Offensive y Strategy). Consider the agents u through v. Let [p, q] be the
longest chain of agents playing y within the interval [u, v]. A policy S : A → Sk uses an
offensive y strategy on the interval [u, v] if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. If no agents in [u, v] play y, there is at least one adversary in Sy such that Sy∩ [u, v] ≥ 1.
If agent u − 1 or v + 1 are playing y, then u ∈ Sy or v ∈ Sy respectively. If u − 1 and
v + 1 both play y, it is sufficient to have either u ∈ Sy or v ∈ Sy.
2. Else, if [p, q] 6= [u, v], then {p− 1, q + 1} ∩ Sy ≥ 1.
Definition B.1.4 (Defensive y Strategy). Consider the agents u through v. Let [p, q] be the
longest chain of agents playing y within the interval [u, v]. A policy S : A → Sk uses a
defensive y strategy on the interval [u, v] if {p, q} ∈ Sy.
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Definition B.1.5 (Aggressive Policy). Let action profile a be divisible into “homogeneous seg-
ments” such that a = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm} and each Ti is of the form {x, x, . . . , x} or {y, y, . . . , y}
and the segments alternate between all playing x and all playing y. For some other action
profile a′, let a′Q(i) refer to the actions of the agents that make up segment i in a
′. A policy
S : A → Sk is an aggressive policy if the following conditions are satisfied when applying the
policy to action profile a′:
• For the lowest index i where segment i is heterogeneous, if Ti is of the form {x, x, . . . , x},
then an offensive and defensive x strategy is applied to Q(i). Else, an offensive and
defensive y strategy is applied to Q(i).
• If there are no heterogeneous segments, then for the lowest index i where a′Q(i) 6= Ti and
Ti is of the form {x, x, . . . , x}, an offensive and defensive x strategy is applied to Q(i).
• If there are no segments where a′Q(i) 6= Ti and Ti is of the form {x, x, . . . , x}, then for the
smallest index i where a′Q(i) 6= Ti and Ti is of the form {y, y, . . . , y}, then an offensive
and defensive y strategy is applied to Q(i).
• For any segment where a′Q(i) = Ti and Ti is of the form {y, y, . . . , y}, a defensive y
strategy is applied to Q(i) if Ti is heterogeneous with only one contiguous segment of
agents playing y, or the agents neighboring Q(i) play x.
• Let Tˆ be a vector that contains the lengths of all segments where Ti is of the form
{x, x, . . . , x}, sorted by increasing length. Let:
λ = argmin
j
j s.t.
j∑
i=1
(
|Tˆi| − 2
)
>
1− α
α
.
Then, a defensive x strategy is applied to the first λ segments where Ti is of form
{x, x, . . . , x} and the longest chain of agents playing x is two. If there are more than λ of
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these segments, then a defensive x strategy is applied to the λ of them with the smallest
length.
We reduce the number of states that are candidates for being the sole stochastically sta-
ble state of the system, then quantify the resistance of the minimum resistance paths between
remaining action profiles. We will primarily consider paths between action profiles that are
“similar”- the action profiles are identical except for the actions of a single segment. Our
comparisons will be restricted to action profiles that are made up solely of homogeneous seg-
ments according to the segmentation scheme set forth in a target profile a. To compare two
action profiles, we will use the following notation. The action profiles will be broken into seg-
ments consistent with a using |, with |x (|y) denoting that for the segment to the left of the |,
Ti = {x, x, . . . , x} ({y, y, . . . , y}). . . . are used in places where the two profiles are identical,
and X (Y ) is used to denote that all agents in the segment play x (y). For instance, consider the
profiles a′ = {. . . |X|x . . . } and a′′ = {. . . |Y |x . . . }. They are identical action profiles, except
the agents in a segment play X in a′ and Y in a′′. Furthermore, the agents in the segment play
X in the target profile a.
Lemma B.1.1 Consider a system attacked by an aggressive policy S with target a. In this sys-
tem, all recurrent classes solely contain instances of {|X|xY |yX|x}, {|Y |yX|xY |y}, {|X|xX|yX|x},
and {|Y |yY |xY |y}.
Proof: Consider a system that is attacked by an aggressive policy based off of an action
profile a. Let a′ be any action profile with at least one heterogeneous segment in it, using
the segmentation scheme outlined in a. By definition of an aggressive policy, there will be a
heterogeneous segment i that is influenced by either an offensive x or y policy. In this case,
there is a path of zero resistance from a′ to an action profile a′′ that is identical to a′, except
a′′Q(i) = Ti. Thus, a
′ cannot be the sole stochastically stable state of the system.
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We will now limit our search for recurrent classes to homogeneous action profiles. Any
action profile that contains an instance of {|X|y Y |x} will not be stochastically stable because
there exists a zero resistance path to a similar action profile where {|X|y Y |x} is replaced with
{|X|y X|x}. The remaining segment patterns that can be used to construct valid recurrent
classes are {|X|xY |yX|x}, {|Y |yX|xY |y}, {|X|xX|yX|x}, and {|Y |yY |xY |y}. There exist no
zero-resistance transitions from any of these segment patterns, so any recurrent class must be
composed solely of segments in these patterns.
We will construct paths by stringing together a series of unilateral deviations where an agent
switches their selected action in an action profile a′. The resistance of a unilateral deviation
that occurs at agent i is given by the resistance function r(f, g, h):
r(f, g, h) =
[
gV (f, f) + V (f, h)−
(2− g)V ({x, y} \ f, {x, y} \ f)− V ({x, y} \ f, h)]
+
, (B.1)
where [ ]+ is the positive orthant, f = a′(i), g = |{j|j ∈ Ni, a′(j) = a′(i)}|, and
h =

x if i ∈ Sx,
y if i ∈ Sy,
0 else.
.
As shorthand, we will refer to different types of unilateral deviations by describing them
using the function r. f is the action agent i plays in a′, g is the number of neighbors that
also play that action, and h is the action an adversary is broadcasting to agent i (0 if there is
no adversary). For instance, a deviation of type r(x, 1, y) refers to a deviation between two
action profiles that are identical, except agent i switches from x to y. Agent i has one neighbor
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playing x and is influenced by an adversary playing y.
Lemma B.1.2 Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets
action profile a. Then:
R ({. . . |Y |x . . . } → {. . . |X|x . . . }) ≤ 1− α. (B.2)
Proof: Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets a.
Let a′ and a′′ be two similar profiles where a′ = {. . . |Y |x . . . }, a′′ = {. . . |Y |x . . . }, and the
segment that differs is segment i. Let Q(i) = [u, v]. The first path (denoted by→1) that will be
considered is in the case that |{j ∈ {u, v}|aj = x}| > 0. then an agent neighboring segment
i plays x and there is a series of unilateral transitions from a′ to a′′ with total resistance given
by:
R ({. . . |Y |x . . . } →1 {. . . |X|x . . . }) =
(|Q(i)| − 1)r(y, 1, Sx) + r(y, 0, Sx) = 0. (B.3)
The second case is where |{j ∈ {u, v}|aj = x}| = 0. In this case, there exists a second path
(→2) with resistance:
R ({. . . |Y |x . . . } →2 {. . . |X|x . . . }) =
r(y, 2, 0) + (|Q(i)| − 2)r(y, 1, Sx) + r(y, 0, Sx) = 1− α. (B.4)
These two paths cover all possible action profiles a′ and a′′, thus
R ({. . . |Y |x . . . } → {. . . |X|x . . . }) ≤ 1− α. (B.5)
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Lemma B.1.3 Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets
action profile a. Then:
R ({. . . |X|x . . . } → {. . . |Y |x . . . }) > 1− α. (B.6)
Proof: Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets a.
Let a′ and a′′ be two similar profiles where a′ = {. . . |X|x . . . }, a′′ = {. . . |Y |x . . . }, and the
segment that differs is segment i. Let Q(i) = [u, v], and assume that au, av = x.
All transition paths from a′′ to a′ will have a higher resistance than 1− α. Transition paths
can be described as one of the three following types:
• have at least one transition of type r(x, 2, 0) = 2 + 2α,
• have at least one transition of type r(x, 1, x) = 1 + 2α,
• only contain transitions of type r(x, 1, 0) = α.
The first two paths will both have minimum resistance greater than 1 − α. We will now
characterize the minimum number of transitions of type r(x, 1, 0) that occur on paths of the
third type.
Under an aggressive policy, defensive strategies will be used on up to λ x segments that
only have two neighboring agents playing x. Before a defensive x strategy is used on segment
i, |Q(i)| − 2 agents must switch from x to y (see figure B.1). To construct a path from a′ to
a′′ that consists solely of transitions of type r(x, 1, 0), these transitions must occur at at least
λ different segments before occurring at the desired segment i to ensure that a defensive x
strategy is not employed on segment i. The minimum total resistance of these transitions is
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Figure B.1: Adversary assignments under an aggressive policy. No adversaries are deployed to X
segments until only two neighboring agents playing x remain.
given by attacking the λ smallest x segments first which yields resistance:
R ({. . . |X|x . . . } →3 {. . . |Y |x . . . }) =
r(x, 1, 0)
λ∑
i=1
(
|Tˆi| − 2
)
=
α
λ∑
i=1
(
|Tˆi| − 2
)
>
1− α
α
, (B.7)
which is greater than 1− α by the definition of λ. Any paths that target larger x segments will
have strictly larger resistance. Thus, all paths will have resistance greater than 1−α such that:
R ({. . . |X|x . . . } → {. . . |Y |x . . . }) > 1− α. (B.8)
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Lemma B.1.4 Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets
action profile a. Then:
R ({. . . |X|y . . . } → {. . . |Y |y . . . }) ≤ 1 + 2α. (B.9)
Proof: Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets a.
Let a′ and a′′ be two similar profiles where a′ = {. . . |X|y . . . }, a′′ = {. . . |X|y . . . }, and the
segment that differs is segment i. Let Q(i) = [u, v]. The first path (denoted by→1) that will
be considered is in the case that |{j ∈ {u, v}|aj = y}| > 0. An agent neighboring segment
i plays y and there is a series of unilateral transitions from a′ to a′′ with total resistance given
by:
R ({. . . |X|y . . . } →1 {. . . |Y |y . . . }) = (|Q(i)| − 1)r(x, 1, Sy) + r(x, 0, 0) = 0. (B.10)
The second case is where |{j ∈ {u, v}|aj = x}| = 0. In this case, there exists a second path
(→2) with resistance:
R ({. . . |X|y . . . } →2 {. . . |Y |y . . . }) =
r(x, 2, Sy) + (|Q(i)| − 2)r(x, 1, Sy) + r(x, 0, Sy) = 1 + 2α. (B.11)
These two paths cover all possible action profiles a′ and a′′, thus
R ({. . . |Y |x . . . } → {. . . |X|x . . . }) ≤ 1 + 2α. (B.12)
Lemma B.1.5 Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets
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action profile a. Then:
R ({. . . |Y |y . . . } → {. . . |X|y . . . }) > 1 + 2α. (B.13)
Proof: Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets a.
Let a′ and a′′ be two similar profiles where a′ = {. . . |X|y . . . }, a′′ = {. . . |X|y . . . }, and the
segment that differs is segment i. Let Q(i) = [u, v], and assume that au, av = x.
All transition paths from a′′ to a′ will have a higher resistance than 1+2α. Transition paths
can be described as one of the three following types:
• no deviations occur involving agents who have two neighbors playing y (→1),
• only one deviation occurs involving an agent who has two neighbors playing y (→2),
• more than one deviation occurs involving agents who have two neighbors playing y (→3).
The resistance of all paths of the first type is given by:
R ({. . . |Y |y . . . } →1 {. . . |X|y . . . }) =
(|Q(i)| − 1)r(y, 1, Sy) + r(y, 0, Sy) = (|Q(i)| − 1)(1− α). (B.14)
When |Q(i)| > 2+α
1−α , this resistance will be greater than 1 + 2α.
We will now limit analysis to lengths |Q(i)| > 2+α
1−α . In all paths of the second type,
one agent with two neighbors playing y will switch to x, leaving two smaller y segments on
either end of the agent. Let `y be the length of the largest segment after this transition, where
`y =
⌊
|Q(i)|
2
⌋
. The resistance of all paths of the second type is given by:
R ({. . . |Y |y . . . } →1 {. . . |X|y . . . }) =
r(y, 2, 0) + (`y)r(y, 1, Sy) + r(y, 0, Sy) = 2 + (1− α)`y. (B.15)
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When |Q(i)| > 2+α
1−α , this resistance will be greater than 1 + 2α.
The resistance of all paths of the third type will always be greater than 4, since there are
at least two deviations involving an agent who has two neighbors playing y. Thus, all possible
paths will have a resistance greater than 1 + 2α. If we change the assumption that the agents
surroundingQ(i) play x, the minimum resistance only increases higher than 1+2α. Therefore,
R ({. . . |Y |y . . . } → {. . . |X|y . . . }) > 1 + 2α. (B.16)
To facilitate our classification of recurrent classes, we will introduce some new notation.
Every recurrent class can be assigned a level of “disagreement” corresponding to how many
segments play different actions relative to their counterparts in a:
d(a′) = |{i|a′Q(i) 6= aQ(i)}|. (B.17)
Lemma B.1.6 In a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets a, con-
sider the graphG formed by connecting recurrent classes through the minimum resistance edge
leaving each class. G consists of disconnected subgraphs Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm such that with each
subgraph Qi:
1. ∃ u, v s.t. (u, v), (v, u) ∈ Qi,
2. if (u, v), (v, u) ∈ Qi, then d(u) = min{d(j)|j ∈ Qi}.
Proof: Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets a.
Construct the graph G by connecting recurrent classes through the minimum resistance edge
leaving each class.
By Lemma B.1.1, we can limit the action profiles that are recurrent classes to any ac-
tion profile composed solely of combinations of the patterns {|X|xY |yX|x}, {|Y |yX|xY |y},
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{|X|xX|yX|x}, and {|Y |yY |xY |y}. Recurrent classes can be sorted into two categories: recur-
rent classes that contain at least one instance of {|Y |yY |xY |y} and those that do not.
For recurrent classes that contain an instance of {|Y |yY |xY |y}, the least resistance edge
leaving the class is to a similar class where {|Y |yY |xY |y} is replaced with {|Y |yX|xY |y}. By
Lemma B.1.2, this transition will have a resistance of 1 − α. Thus, every recurrent class with
disagreement z that contains an instance of {|Y |yY |xY |y} has a minimum resistance edge that
leads to a recurrent class of disagreement z − 1.
Classes that do not contain an instance of {|Y |yY |xY |y} can be further broken down into
two categories: the action profile ~x and all other remaining recurrent classes. By lemma B.1.4,
the minimum resistance path out of ~x has resistance 1 + 2α and leads to a class that has
disagreement that is one less than ~x. All remaining classes will have at least one instance of
{|X|xX|yX|xY |y}. There are three possible forms the minimum resistance edge out of these
classes will have:
• The minimum resistance edge leads to a similar class where an instance of {|X|xY |yX|x}
is replaced with {|Y |yY |xY |y}. By B.1.4 this edge has resistance 1 + 2α.
• The minimum resistance edge leads to a similar class where an instance of {|X|yX|xY |y}
is replaced with {|Y |yY |xY |y}. By B.1.3, this edge has resistance 1− α < R < 1 + 2α.
• The minimum resistance edge leads to a similar class where an instance of {|Y |yX|xY |y}
is replaced with {|Y |yY |xY |y}. By B.1.3, this edge has resistance 1− α < R < 1 + 2α.
If the minimum resistance path is of the first two forms, the edge leads to a class that either
has a lower disagreement or has an minimum resistance edge leaving it that connects to a class
with lower disagreement. If the minimum resistance path is of the third form, then the edge
leads to a class that has higher disagreement. In this case, let the class that has an edge of the
third type be u and the class that it is connected to be v.
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For each class u that exists, there will be a subgraph Qi (see figure B.2). All edges within
Qi except the edge leaving u will lead to a class that either has lower disagreement or has an
edge connecting that class to a class with lower disagreement, meaning class u has the lowest
disagreement of all classes in Qi. Class v will contain an instance of {|Y |yY |xY |y}, and there
will then be a minimum resistance edge connecting v to u. Then,
1. ∃ u, v s.t. (u, v), (v, u) ∈ Qi,
2. if (u, v), (v, u) ∈ Qi, then d(u) = min{d(j)|j ∈ Qi}.
Lemma B.1.7 The minimum resistance rooted tree in any family Qi is the minimum resistance
subgraph Qi minus the edge (u, v).
Proof: Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets
profile a with family Qi. A rooted tree T can be constructed by taking the minimum resistance
subgraphQi and removing the edge (u, v). Replacing any of the edges in T other with different
edges will result in a rooted tree with potential that is at least as much as T , as all new edges
will have at least the same resistance as the original edges in T . Then, the minimum resistance
rooted tree in Qi is the minimum resistance subgraph Qi minus the edge (u, v).
We will refer to the recurrent class ahi that the minimum potential rooted tree Ti of family
Qi is rooted in as the “head” class of family Qi. We will overload the disagreement function
such that the disagreement of some rooted tree Ti is given by:
d(Ti) = d(a
h
i ). (B.18)
Lemma B.1.8 Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets
a. Then, @ i s.t. a′ ∈ Qi : Ti = Y, ahQ(i) = X, a′Q(i) = Y .
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Figure B.2: Example subgraph Qi formed by connecting classes through the minimum resistance edge
exiting each class. There exists one class with minimal disagreement, ah, and the edge leaving this class
leads to a class with higher disagreement. All other edges in Qi lead to classes with either the same or
lower disagreement.
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Proof: Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets a.
Within any minimum potential rooted tree in Qi, all edges are between similar classes where
the following transitions occur:
• {|Y |yY |xY |y} → {|Y |yX|xY |y},
• {|X|xY |yX|x} → {|Y |yY |xY |y},
• {|X|yX|xY |y} → {|Y |yY |xY |y}.
None of the transitions contain a segment that transitions from |Y |y to |X|y. Thus, if a segment
in ahi plays |X|y, there are no classes in Qi where that same segment plays |Y |y and therefore
@ i s.t. a′ ∈ Qi : Ti = Y, ahQ(i) = X, a′Q(i) = Y .
Lemma B.1.9 Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets
a. Then:
min
u∈Ti,T ′,v∈T ′
R(u→ v) = min
T ′,v∈T ′
R(ahi → v) (B.19)
and
min
T ′,v∈T ′
R(ahi → v) = min
T ′:d(T ′)<d(Ti),v∈T ′
R(ahi → v). (B.20)
Proof: Consider a system that is influenced by some aggressive policy S that targets a.
We will identify the minimum resistance edge leaving some rooted tree Ti in family Qi and
connecting to a class in another family. For all families Qi : a /∈ Qi, ahi 6= a and thus ahi
contains at least one instance of |X|y. By transitioning to a similar class with the segment
replaced with |Y |y, there is always edge leaving the family with resistance 1 + 2α. Because of
this, any edges with resistance greater than 1 + 2α do not need to be considered when search-
ing for the minimum resistance edge leaving Ti. Any edges between classes with resistance
R{|Y |y} → {|X|y} > 1 + 2α cannot be the minimum resistance edge leaving Ti.
The remaining edges that leave Ti that need to be considered are between similar classes
where the following transitions occur:
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• {|X|xX|yX|x} → {|X|xY |yX|x},
• {|X|yX|xY |y} → {|Y |yY |xY |y}.
Both of these transitions contain an instance of {|X|y} → {|Y |y}. By Lemma B.1.8, if the
segment that becomes {|Y |y} is not {|Y |y} in ahi , then that transition at that segment does not
occur in any edges in Ti. Additionally, ahi will contain the most instances of {|Y |y} out of all
classes in Ti. For any edge between similar classes that leaves Ti of the two aforementioned
forms, there exists an edge with the same or less resistance leaving ahi where the same transition
occurs. Therefore,
min
u∈Ti,T ′,v∈T ′
R(u→ v) = min
T ′,v∈T ′
R(ahi → v). (B.21)
Let the minimum resistance edge exiting Ti from ahi connect to a class in the minimum poten-
tial rooted tree T ′ in family Q′. Additionally, since the minimum resistance edge exiting Ti
from ahi will be one of the two aforementioned types and both transitions lead to classes that
either have lower disagreement than ahi or have an edge connecting them to a class with lower
disagreement, d(T ′) < d(Ti). Thus:
min
T ′,v∈T ′
R(ahi → v) = min
T ′:d(T ′)<d(Ti),v∈T ′
R(ahi → v). (B.22)
Theorem B.1.1 Under an aggressive policy based on a, the rooted tree with minimal stochas-
tic potential is rooted in a.
Proof: Consider a system attacked by an aggressive policy based on some action profile
a. Let T be the rooted tree constructed by connecting all m of the minimum potential rooted
trees Ti in families Qi by the minimum resistance edges leaving each ahi 6= a (see figure B.3).
Since all edges that leave the Ti connect to trees with strictly lower disagreement, the tree ends
up rooted in a, the class with minimal disagreement.
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This tree has the minimum potential of all possible rooted trees because each sub-tree Ti
is of minimal potential and they are connected using the minimum number of edges, m − 1,
where each edge is the minimal resistance edge leaving the tree Ti. Altering any edges to root
the tree in any class that is not a will result in a tree with strictly greater potential. Because
the minimum potential resistance tree is rooted in a, a is the sole strictly stochastic state of the
system.
Lemma B.1.10 Let a be an action profile with n segments and a′ be an action profile with
n+ 2 segments. Then, R(a→ a′) ≥ 1− α.
Proof: Let a be an action profile with n segments and a′ be an action profile with n + 2
segments. We will assume that the adversary sets are chosen to minimize the resistance along
the path we outline. Any path from a to a′ requires at least one transition of type r(x, 2, Sy) =
1+2α or r(y, 2, Sx) = 1−α. If adversaries are assigned to sets in any other way, the resistance
of these transitions can only stay the same or increase. Thus, R(a→ a′) ≥ 1− α.
Lemma B.1.11 Assume that an aggressive policy S can stabilize target action profile a within
a system characterized by payoff gain α and adversarial budget γ. Let a′ be an action profile
that has the same number of segments as a. If a policy requires fewer adversaries than S, then
there always exists some a′ such that R(a→ a′) < 1− α.
Proof: Assume that an aggressive policy S can stabilize target action profile a within a
system characterized by payoff gain α and adversarial budget γ. Consider any policy S ′ 6= S
that uses fewer adversaries than S.
Let a′ be an action profile that has the same number of segments as a. Because S ′ uses
fewer adversaries than S, there will always exist a segment i in a′ such that either Ti = Y
and Q(i) is not targeted by a defensive y strategy or Ti ∈ {Tˆ1, Tˆ2, . . . , Tˆλ} and Q(i) is not
targeted by a defensive x strategy. Then, it is always possible to construct a path from a to a′
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Figure B.3: Example minimum potential resistance tree rooted in a. Each family consists of classes
connected by the minimum resistance edges leaving each node. The head of each family is connected to
other families through the minimum resistance edge leaving its family. All edges either lead to a class
with lower disagreement, or to a class that has an edge connected to a class with lower disagreement,
resulting in a minimum potential tree rooted in a.
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using only transitions of type r(x, 1, 0) = α and r(y, 1, 0) = 0. There will always be less than
λ∑
i=1
(
|Tˆi| − 2
)
transitions of type r(x, 1, 0), so by definition of λ, R(a→ a′) < 1− α.
Theorem B.1.2 If a policy uses fewer adversaries than an aggressive policy does to attempt
to stabilize profile a, a will not be the sole stochastically stable state of the system.
Proof: Assume that an aggressive policy S can stabilize target action profile a within a
system characterized by payoff gain α and adversarial budget γ. Consider any policy S ′ 6= S
that uses fewer adversaries than S. Assume that we have a resistance tree rooted in a, and the
adversary is using fewer adversaries than an aggressive policy calls for to attempt to stabilize
a. By lemma B.1.11, there exists a path from a to some action profile a′ with two less segments
that has resistance less than 1−α. a′ may or may not be a recurrent class. If a′ is not a recurrent
class, there exists some other action profile a′′ that is a recurrent class with R(a′ → a′′) = 0.
By lemma B.1.10, the path from a′ to a contains an edge ewith resistance of at least 1−α. It
is possible to re-root the tree in a′ (or a′′ if a′ is not a recurrent class) by eliminating edge e and
routing a to a′ (a′′) along the minimum resistance path from a to a′, where R(a→ a′) < 1−α.
This new tree will no longer be rooted in a, and will have lower stochastic potential. Thus, a
will not be the stochastically stable state of the system.
Corollary B.1.1 If an action profile can be established as the sole stochastically stable state
of a system, then an aggressive policy does so using the fewest number of adversaries.
Lemma B.1.12 Let k be the number of homogeneous Y segments and l be the number of
homogeneous X segments of length 2 in some profile a. The minimum adversary budget γ
needed to implement an aggressive policy based on a is then given by 2(k+l)
n
when α < 0.5 and
2k
n
when α ≥ 0.5.
Proof: Let k be the number of homogeneous Y segments and l be the number of x
segments that are length 2 in some profile a. Under an aggressive policy, there needs to be two
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adversaries per Y segment in a to ensure that a is a recurrent class. When α < 0.5, there also
needs to be two adversaries for each of the l X segments of length two. In both cases, there
also needs to be two adversaries for each of the λ smallest segments playing X in a to ensure
the resistances put forth in Lemma B.1.3 hold true. Because there will always be a Y segment
for every X segment in a, k ≥ j.
Consider a segment i. If i is targeted with a defensive y policy, adversaries will only
be assigned to Q(i) if the agents neighboring Q(i) play x. If i is targeted with a defensive x
strategy and |Q(i)| > 2, adversaries will only be assigned toQ(i) if segment i is heterogeneous
with one instance of two neighboring agents playing x. An aggressive policy requires 2k
adversaries to ensure that defensive strategies can be deployed on all Y segments. There also
needs to be 2λ adversaries to ensure that defensive strategies can be deployed on λX segments.
However, it is possible for strategies to “share” adversaries- if adversaries need to be deployed
to an X segment of length greater than 2, there will necessarily be a neighboring Y segment
that no longer needs an adversary deployed to the agent that borders the X segment to satisfy
the requirements of a defensive y strategy (see Figure B.4). When α < 0.5, there will always
need to be two adversaries on each of the l X segments of length 2, then the remaining λ− l X
segments will be able to borrow from Y segments when necessary. In this case, the aggressive
policy requires 2k + λ + l adversaries to implement defensive strategies. When α ≥ 0.5, X
segments no longer need to be defended so the necessary number of adversaries needed to
implement defensive strategies is given by 2k.
In order to implement offensive strategies, an aggressive policy only needs one adversary.
Thus, the total number of adversaries needed to implement a complete aggressive policy based
on a is given by the number of adversaries required for defensive strategies plus one.
For any action profile a, another action profile a′ with the same efficiency and m times
the number of agents in a can be created by appending m action profiles a to each other. The
minimum number of adversaries needed to implement an aggressive policy based on m is then
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Figure B.4: Adversary allocation for two different action profiles. When adversaries are deployed to an
X segment with length greater than two, a neighboring Y segment no longer needs an adversary on one
of its edges.
given by 2m(k + l) + j + 1 when α < 0.5 and 2mk + 1 when α ≥ 0.5. When α < 0.5 the
adversary budget needed to have the required number of adversaries is given by 2m(k+l)+j+1
mn
,
and when α ≥ 0.5 it is given by 2mk+1
mn
. As m approaches infinity, this limit goes to 2(k+l)
n
. In
the case where α ≥ 0.5, the limit instead goes to 2k
n
.
Lemma B.1.13 It is impossible for any profile a that has a single agent playing x surrounded
by agents playing y to be the stochastically stable state under the influence of a mobile intelli-
gent adversary for any value of 0 < α < 1.
Proof: Consider an action profile a that contains an instance of a single agent i playing
x surrounded by agents playing y. Assume the system is influenced by the adversary set that
maximizes the resistance of any unilateral deviation away from a involving i, i ∈ Sx. In this
case, a unilateral deviation at i has a resistance of [1 + α− 2]+ = 0, meaning there exists a
zero-resistance path leading out of a, thus disqualifying a from being a recurrent class and the
sole stochastically stable state of the system.
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Lemma B.1.14 Consider a system attacked by an aggressive policy S based on some action
profile a. If a has any segments i such that Ti = Y , |Q(i)| <
⌊
2+α
1−α
⌋
+ 1, then a cannot be the
sole stochastically stable state of the system.
Proof: Consider an action profile a that contains a segment i such that Ti = Y and
|Q(i)| < ⌊2+α
1−α
⌋
+ 1. Let a′ be a similar action profile where a′Q(i) = X . There always
exists a path between a and a′ consisting of |Q(i)| − 1 transitions of type r(y, 1, y). Then,
R(a → a′) < (1 − α) ⌊2+α
1−α
⌋
< 1 + 2α. By Lemma B.1.4, R(a′ → a) = 1 + 2α. Let T be
the minimum resistance tree rooted in a. There always exists a tree T ′ rooted in a′ obtained by
removing the edge (a′, a) and replacing it with (a, a′) that has lower stochastic potential than
T . Thus, a cannot be the sole stochastically stable state of the system.
We are now ready to pose the optimization to find the minimum efficiency profile a that can
be stabilized in a system characterized by payoff gain α and adversary budget γ. By Lemmas
B.1.13 and B.1.14, all X segments must be length 2 or greater and all Y segments must be
length
⌊
2+α
1−α
⌋
+ 1 or more. By B.1.12, if α < 0.5 there needs to be two adversaries for each Y
segment of any length and X segment of length two in a. If α ≥ 0.5, there only needs to be
two adversaries for every Y segment in a. Then, the optimization can be posed as a modified
version of (4.1) with adjusted surpluses sk.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1.6
This proof follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.1.3. Upon relaxing the integer
constraint in Theorem 4.1.6, it is possible to solve for a closed form expression for the minimal
efficiency. The major difference is that in the mobile intelligent case, the necessary number
of adversaries needed to stabilize a segment is a constant instead of a linear function of the
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lengths of the X and Y segments. Solving for efficiency we obtain:
η(γ, α, `x) =
c− 2γ + αγ(`x − 1)
c(1 + α)
, (B.23)
where c = 2 if `x > 1α and c = 4 otherwise. For both of these cases, (B.23) is minimized when
`x is minimized. For the first regime, the minimum value of `x is 1α while in the second it is 2.
By then solving (B.23) for the minimum efficiency in both cases, the case where `x ≥ 1α will
always have the lower efficiency, given by:
η(γ, α) =
2− γ(1− α)
2(1 + α)
. (B.24)
When α > 1
2
, `x cannot be less than 2. In this regime, the minimum efficiency is given by:
η(γ, α) =
2− 2γ + αγ
2(1 + α)
. (B.25)
Thus, the minimum efficiency attainable as a function of η and α is given by:
η(γ, α) =

2−γ(1−α)
2(1+α)
if α < 1
2
,
2−2γ+αγ
2(1+α)
else.
(B.26)
In addition to the minimum efficiency equations, there are also “saturation” limits for γ where
increasing γ past some critical point does not decrease efficiency due to length limitations on
X and Y segments. Define c(α) as the saturation limit when minimum efficiency is given by
(B.24) and b(α) when it is given by (B.25). In the regime 0 < α ≤ 1
4
, the minimum lengths of
X and Y segments are respectively 1
α
and 3. For 1
4
< α ≤ 1
2
, the minimum lengths of X and
Y segments are respectively 1
α
and 2+α
1−α . Finally, for
1
2
< α ≤ 1, the minimum lengths of X
and Y segments are respectively 2 and 2+α
1−α . When these limitations are applied to (B.24) and
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(B.25), it is possible to calculate b(α) and c(α) as follows:
b(α) =

4
5
α ≤ 1
4
,
4(1−α)
4−α ,
c(α) =

2α
1+3α
α ≤ 1
4
,
2α(1−α)
1+α+α2
1
4
< α ≤ 1
2
,
2(1−α)
4−α else.
By applying these saturation values to (B.24) and (B.25) and taking the minimum efficiency of
the two functions in each of the three regimes, we can determine the minimum efficiency as a
function of α and γ. In the region where b(α) < γ < (¸α), the minimum efficiency is achieved
by using a combination of segments using the saturation lengths used to determine b(α) and
c(α) to get a line that connects the minimum efficiency of the b(α) regime to the minimum
efficiency of the c(α) regime.
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Appendix C
Oblivious Adversaries
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2.1
If kx > 0, there exist influence sets which induce equilibria that have strictly higher effi-
ciency than ~y. For kx ≥ ky, these sets are created by alternating the indexes assigned to each
influence set such that {1, 3, . . . , 2ky − 1} ∈ Sx and {2, 4, . . . , 2ky} ∈ Sy, then assigning the
remaining adversaries to Sx. The argument for ky > kx is similar. Because a heterogeneous
action profile can never be stochastically stable if it strictly alternates between x and y (by
Lemma A.1.2), this means that the adversary can never guarantee that a heterogeneous action
profile is induced, leaving only ~y and implying that ky = k.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2.2
The proof of Theorem 4.2.2 proceeds in two steps. First, Lemma C.2.1 shows that a random
adversary cannot gain anything by influencing any agent to play x. Next, we combine this fact
with results from [18] to complete the proof.
Lemma C.2.1 When α < 1/2, the solution to (3.8) has kx = 0 and ky = k.
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Proof: Regardless of what the adversary chooses, the only possible stochastically-stable
action profiles are ~x and ~y; this essentially follows from the fact that they are the only Nash
equilibria of the nominal game. Because of this, the adversary’s only viable option is to maxi-
mally target the ~y profile, which is accomplished by choosing kx = 0 and ky = k.
When the adversary chooses kx = 0, the problem reduces to that of Theorem 5 in [18], in
which an adversary randomly influences subsets of N with action y. In that setting, it is shown
that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, joint action ~y is strictly stochastically stable if and only if
α < 1/2, and that if α ≥ 1/2, joint action ~x is stochastically stable (strict if α > 1/2). The
efficiency of ~y is 1/(1 + α), yielding (4.7).
67
Bibliography
[1] S. Martı´nez, J. Corte´s, and F. Bullo, Motion Coordination with Distributed Information,
Control Systems Magazine 27 (2007), no. 4 75–88.
[2] R. Olfati-Saber, J. A. Fax, and R. M. Murray, Consensus and cooperation in networked
multi-agent systems, Proceedings of the IEEE 95 (2007), no. 1 215–233,
[arXiv:1009.6050].
[3] M. Zhu and S. Martı´nez, Distributed coverage games for mobile visual sensors (I):
Reaching the set of Nash equilibria, in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision
and Control, pp. 169–174, 2009. arXiv:1002.0367.
[4] V. Ramaswamy and J. R. Marden, A sensor coverage game with improved efficiency
guarantees, in Proceedings of the American Control Conference, vol. 2016-July,
pp. 6399–6404, 2016.
[5] A. Jadbabaie, J. Lin, and S. A. Morse, Coordination of groups of mobile autonomous
agents using nearest neighbor rules., Transactions on Automatic Control 48 (2003),
no. 6 988–1001.
[6] N. Li and J. R. Marden, Designing games for distributed optimization, IEEE Journal on
Selected Topics in Signal Processing 7 (2013), no. 2 230–242.
[7] J. R. Marden, H. P. Young, and L. Y. Pao, Achieving pareto optimality through
distributed learning, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 52 (2014), no. 5
2753–2770.
[8] J. R. Marden and J. S. Shamma, Game Theory and Distributed Control, in Handbook of
Game Theory Vol. 4 (H. Young and S. Zamir, eds.). Elsevier Science, 2014.
[9] L. Pavel, Game Theory for Control of Optical Networks. Springer Science & Business
Media, 2012.
[10] D. H. Wolpert and K. Tumer, Optimal Payoff Functions for Members of Collectives,
Advances in Complex Systems 04 (2001), no. 02n03 265–279.
[11] R. D. McKelvey and T. R. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for normal form games,
Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), no. 1 6–38.
68
[12] L. E. Blume, The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision, Games and
Economic Behavior 11 (1995), no. 2 111–145.
[13] C. Alo´s-Ferrer and N. Netzer, The logit-response dynamics, Games and Economic
Behavior 68 (2010), no. 2 413–427.
[14] M. Kearns, M. L. Littman, and S. Singh, Graphical Models for Game Theory,
Proceedings of the 17th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence (2001),
no. Owen 253–260, [arXiv:1301.2281].
[15] A. Montanari and A. Saberi, The spread of innovations in social networks., Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107 (2010), no. 47
20196–20201.
[16] D. Shah and J. Shin, Dynamics in Congestion Games, Proc. ACM SIGMETRICS’10 38
(2010) 107.
[17] H. P. Borowski and J. R. Marden, Understanding the Influence of Adversaries in
Distributed Systems, in IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC),
pp. 2301–2306, 2015.
[18] P. N. Brown, H. P. Borowski, and J. R. Marden, Security Against Impersonation Attacks
in Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems (2018)
[arxiv.org/abs/1710.08500].
[19] Y. Lim and J. Shamma, Robustness of stochastic stability in game theoretic learning, in
American Control Conference (ACC), pp. 6160–6165, 2013.
[20] J. R. Marden, G. Arslan, and J. S. Shamma, Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for
potential games, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 54 (2009), no. 2 208–220.
[21] B. Pradelski and H. P. Young, Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems,
Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012), no. 2 882–897.
[22] H. P. Young, The Evolution of Conventions, Econometrica 61 (1993), no. 1 57–84.
[23] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14
(1996), no. 1 124–143.
69
